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The Crimea crisis rudely thrust the state and capabilities of the Russian military into the centre of international attention. The decisiveness of Putin's actions left the rest of the world watch helplessly from the side-lines as Russian troops occupied the peninsula in preparation of the take-over following a hastily arranged referendum. Clearly, Russia's performance in Crimea gave lie to those who had argued over the past 20 years that failed reforms left Russia and provide an answer to any political and strategic problem. But as is well known, it did not take long for world events to interfere with this apparently perfect solution. Protracted ethnic conflicts in the Balkans throughout the 1990s and the drawn-out wars in Afghanistan and Iraq started sowing doubts in the minds of many about the virtues of undue technological optimism. 24 Criticism of the merits of the revolution in military affairs and of related techno-centric concepts, such as networkcentric warfare, became increasingly common. 25 Calls were made by some to 'transform transformation' away from the focus on technology and superior firepower and for a reorientation back towards the need for 'boots on the ground'. turned into a protracted conflict. 27 The failures of the Russian military in their conduct of the Chechen wars were, of course, manifold and they have been well documented elsewhere. But suffice it to say that it was not the lack of high-tech sophistication that was held responsible for failure in these cases. Instead, fingers were pointed at excessive use of force and the Russian military's structural and doctrinal unpreparedness for engaging in counterinsurgency warfare. 28 Yes, the use of dumb bombs for the destruction of Grozny caused an excess in civilian deaths that could, at least in theory, have been reduced with more precision weapons. Moreover, cutting-edge command-and-control systems and better kit for Russian troops would have probably brought down the number of soldiers killed. But as desirable as this would have been, it is unlikely that better equipment would have averted the strategic failure of these campaigns. We only need to look at the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, where US coalition forces got bogged down in protracted conflicts in spite of having the world's most advanced military technology at their disposal. Whilst these conflicts are not fully comparable to the Chechen wars, they nonetheless demonstrate that technology is not a panacea for all circumstances, especially when an insurgency is involved.
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Following Russia's war with Georgia in 2008, much was made of the failures of the Russian armed forces, especially when it came to shortcomings in C4ISR. Outdated or absent technology was held responsible for having caused an excess in Russian combat deaths and several aircraft were lost to blue-on-blue incidents as a result of the pilots' inability to communicate with troops on the ground.
Russia's experience in Georgia underscored the failure of previous military reforms in the eyes of many and it also served as the impetus for the announcement of Serdiukov's radical 2008 reform plans that emphasized the need to modernize weapons and equipment. 29 As already mentioned, the development of network-centric warfare capabilities turned into a central talking point of reform and featured increasingly prominently in statements made by the top military brass. 30 However, the strategic significance of Russian military failures in Georgia owing to the lack of high-tech equipment was clearly overstated. At the end of the day, the Russian military quickly succeeded in ejecting Georgian forces from South Ossetia and Abkhazia and was able to withdraw from the rest of Georgia within a matter of five days. It seems fair to say that this is not a mean feat by the standards of any military and it demonstrated that by 2008 that the Russian army was not quite as inadequate or close to ruin as some people believed. More high-tech equipment might have allowed it to execute the operation even more quickly and with fewer casualties and aircraft lost. However, it was clearly not essential in this case for the achievement of strategic victory.
The Russian troops' effective conduct and performance in Crimea indicated that further progress had been made since the Georgia war in improving command and control and inter-service coordination. Observers also noted the use of more 'modern' kit that had previously been absent, such as new load-carrying equipment and personal radios. But it is also clear that Russia did not achieve its strategic objectives in Crimea simply because of better technology or because it was now 'a more Western-looking army'. 31 After all, during the Crimea crisis the mere deployment of a few units of uniformed men carrying rifles and some posturing involving outdated military vehicles and naval vessels was sufficient to prevent both the Ukrainian interim authorities and their allies from interfering with Moscow's plans. Clearly, the success of this mission was not hindered by Russia's technology gap with Western militaries and the lack of cutting-edge equipment. Simply speaking, from a strategic perspective the objectives of the Georgian conflict and the occupation and take-over of Crimea were achievable by the use, or threat thereof, of military force, whereas the objectives of the Chechen wars were not. But this was a matter of the strategy on which the operations were based, and not a question of technological sophistication. debate. As such, it is highly doubtful whether these sanctions will coerce the Russian leadership into changing tack.
What kind of army does Russia need?
Another mistake in many analyses of Russian military reforms before the Crimea crisis was the failure to address one crucial question: what kind of army Russia really needed and wanted, given its specific strategic context and priorities. Observers of Russian military reforms over the past twenty years simply took it for granted that the Russian military needed to abandon conscription and mobilization capacities in favour of smaller units that are 'mobile, flexible and professional and, therefore, combat-ready for scenarios like local conflicts and asymmetrical warfare'. 33 As Zoltan Barany asserted in 2005, the outmoded practice of conscription and mobilisation simply was incompatible with the 'small-scale soft security threats [Russia] should anticipate in the foreseeable future'. 34 Efforts towards this end, in the eyes of many observers, were being stymied, however, by 'hardliners' in the Russian military sticking to 'the old concept of a mass-mobilization army, partly due to traditional threat perceptions and partly due to bureaucratic interests'. 35 Again, a conflict between reformist civilians and conservative military leaders was held responsible for the perceived ambiguities in Russian military thinking. When the latest military doctrine was published in 2010, analysts noted that on the one hand, it 'stated characteristics of modern warfare, but on the other stressed mobilization capabilities'. 36 But as was the case with the issue of high-tech equipment 9 discussed above, Russia's perceived need to 'reform its military into Western-style expeditionary forces' 37 was not straightforward and its failure to move into this direction cannot be accounted for simply by the opposition from conservative generals. Again, such conclusions neglected important aspects of context, three of which will be discussed in the remainder of this article. First of all, the presumption that 'soft' threats and asymmetric wars are now the dominant form of conflict for which successful military reforms must prepare was too simplistic. Second, the notion that the practice of conscription per se was incompatible with a modern military able to uphold Russia's strategic military capabilities was a misconception. Finally, a closer look at Russia's specific strategic context belies the idea that Russian military reforms were ever meant to result in a major reorientation towards 'new' wars or asymmetric warfare and the creation of small, mobile units trained specifically for this purpose.
The shape of future war?
It is clear that something about the character of war has been changing, but, as the Crimea crisis clearly demonstrated, the exact nature of these changes and their implications for the utility of military force remain a matter of debate. Much of the scholarship on war over the past two decades was characterized by categorical assertions of unprecedented newness and 'historic rupture' in advancing the notion that 'contemporary wars are "substantively distinct" from older patterns of armed conflict'. 38 Such stark reactions were certainly understandable in the immediate aftermath of dramatic and unexpected international events like the end of the Cold War and 9/11. However, with the benefit of hindsight, some analysts in recent years started voicing disquiet about what they perceived as the overly simplistic interpretation of these changes' implications. In particular, the portrayal of a straightforward dichotomy between 'new wars' and an ideal-type of now defunct 'old', conventional interstate warfare characterizing the Cold War years was criticized for lacking historical and international contextualization long before the Crimea crisis occurred. 39 The strategist Hew Strachan, for example, cautioned in 2011 that the perception of 'traditional' interstate war as a relic of the past is both short-sighted and highly questionable. And, as Russia's actions in Crimea clearly showed, he was not wrong. It is one thing to observe that the threat of interstate war appears remote in specific regions of the world at a certain moment in time. However, as Strachan pointed out, it is quite another thing to conclude from this that the same is true forever and on a global scale:
'to extrapolate… from either an American context or a European one to the rest of the world, to
Asia and Africa in particular, seems fanciful… Moreover, those whose thinking is shaped by the Western tradition have almost no historical evidence to support a belief in the obsolescence of certain sorts of war, despite its near orthodoxy.' 40 Other analysts also argued in recent years that the 'near orthodoxy' of the belief in small wars and insurgencies as the epitome of modern conflict could have negative long-term consequences, because of the real-life policy changes it could bring or already has produced. As Gian Gentile, the director of military history at the US Military Academy argued in 2009, the US armed forces' focus on counterinsurgency turned into a 'dogma' that is 'not simply dangerous; it neglects key aspects of U.S. national security' and risks losing the military's capacity 'to conduct operations at the higher end of the conflict spectrum'. 41 In a similar vein, the UK army's Chief of General Staff in the same year called for a continuation of the British military's capacity to engage 'in high-intensity interstate-type warfare' at the same time as 'keeping alive the "conceptual flame" of manoeuvre warfare'. 42 The events in Crimea clearly vindicated such warnings not to consign the possibility of One can imagine a range of possibilities that cover the full spectrum of war and conflict'. 43 It is within this context that Russia's decision to maintain conscription, mobilisation capacities and a strong nuclear deterrent at the same time as modernising its military in other areas should have been understood.
Russia's strategic context: preparing for 'old' or 'new' wars?
The Crimea crisis clearly vindicated Strachan's point above about the importance of strategic context. Extrapolating from Western strategic priorities, many analysts assumed that Russian military reforms had failed because they did not prepare the armed forces for 'new-war type'
scenarios and the fighting of complex overseas contingencies and counterinsurgency campaigns like Afghanistan and Iraq. Russia's performance in Crimea would have come as less of a surprise if the country's specific strategic context had been taken into account more explicitly. As a matter of fact,
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'new-war type' scenarios were never central to Russia's strategic vision and, in contrast to many Western states, expeditionary warfare, overseas contingencies and humanitarian interventions are tasks Russian foreign policy and military doctrine explicitly do not intend the armed forces to get involved in. 44 Russian security policies and military doctrines throughout the post-Cold War era on the one hand did reflect an increasing appreciation of the changing security environment with 'soft' threats and human security issues, including terrorism and other organised transnational crime, illegal migration and even environmental issues making their way into official documents. The
Russian leadership also recognised 'that "new" transnational threats can be non-military in nature and may require non-military and international rather than state-led responses". 45 But, on the other hand, 'new-war type' scenarios and 'soft' security threats were never seen in Russia as the only or most important priority and military doctrine continued emphasising more traditional threats and capabilities in addition to 'modern' warfare. 46 From a strategic point of view, the prioritisation in
Russia of a multitude of threats and military capabilities makes a good deal of sense, bearing in mind the country's geopolitical position and also its feeling of relative 'strategic solitude' compared to most states in the West. 47 Capabilities for dealing with 'new-war type' scenarios like ethnic conflicts, insurgencies and terrorism might dominate alongside Russia's southern flank, in the Caucasus and Central Asia. But in the east, the country is bordering China with its 'multi-million troop army using traditional approaches to the conducting of combat operations…with a great concentration of manpower and firing systems'. This fact alone makes the maintenance of some mobilisation capacities and an element of conscription appear rather rational from a strategic planning point of view. In the West, Russia is facing NATO's numerically and technologically superior 'innovative armies with non-contact forms and methods for using the latest forces and equipment', which Russia could not match in a conventional war. 48 Russia never made it a secret that NATO's post-Cold war activities have long been perceived as a security threat and as an encroachment on the country's regional interests. 49 The latest Russian military doctrine adopted in 2010 explicitly named NATO 'out-of-area' operations and eastward enlargement high on the list of military dangers to the country. 50 This strategic context gives meaning to what many analysts before the Crimea crisis interpreted as Russia's seemingly illogical, concurrent pursuit of a modern military, 'old-fashioned' mobilisation capabilities and nuclear deterrence. 'Traditional' perceptions of potential enemies and conflicts left a mark on Russian military doctrine and foreign policy throughout the post-Soviet era. But it was a mistake to interpret this simply as the inability of Russian generals to move on. Not only because a healthy degree of 'paranoia', is required of the armed forces of any state in their pursuit of the unenviable task to 'think the unthinkable' and to prepare for an uncertain future where it is plausible to presume that 'much that is unpredicted and 12 unpredictable can and will occur.' 51 But also because Russia's strategic vision never envisaged a major reorientation towards a future dominated by 'new war-type' scenarios in the first place.
Continued conscription as a deal-breaker for reform?
The establishment of an all-volunteer force is not strategically expedient for Russia and, in any case, it has also been impossible for a variety of other political and societal reasons. After all, military effectiveness is not the only reason why countries opt for a particular recruitment system, and not only in Russia. Whilst military effectiveness is an important consideration, a confluence of other factors, including economic arguments and domestic political constraints have also influenced the decision of states to maintain or abandon conscription when the Cold War ended. 52 As a result, although the general post-Cold war trend has been towards professional armed forces, a number of highly developed countries also continue to maintain conscription and some capacity for mobilisation, including Finland, Norway, Denmark and Israel. 53 Those countries rely on a combination of recruitment systems, allowing them to maintain both the technological expertise and other professional skills required for the conduct of modern combined armed operations, as well as an element of conscription and mobilisation for situations where greater numbers of infantry solders might be needed. 54 In addition to strategic considerations a confluence of political, societal and economic factors has meant that the outright abolishment of conscription in Russia, too, continues to be a highly unlikely prospect, at least for the foreseeable future. These factors include the conviction that a large reserve is essential and also the conservative belief, which is not only prevalent in Russia, that conscription should be maintained as an instrument for the transmission of patriotic values or as a so-called 'school of the nation'. 55 But Russia's decision not to abandon conscription following the end of the Cold War is more complex than merely the result of interference by conservative generals in the civilian leadership' strategic deliberations.
As Rod Thornton concluded from his analysis of reforms during the Yeltsin era, 'the principal political goals in terms of ending conscription…were not so much to develop a more efficient military -although that would have been a welcome side-effect -rather, Yeltsin wanted to both save money and to court electoral popularity'. 56 The latter factor is particularly poignant and was an important driver behind the push by any Russian politician for a professional military over the past two decades. Reasons for the low esteem of conscript service in Russia are well known. In addition to the fate suffered by many young draftees during the first Chechen war this 'image problem' results from poor conditions of service and in particular the notorious dedovshchina, a brutal practice of hazing and violence against soldiers with sometimes fatal results. 57 The persistent 13 unpopularity of conscription meant that promises of a move towards an all-volunteer force were as politically expedient under Yeltsin as they are today. 58 But the wish to phase out conscription for political reasons, no matter how genuine it might have been at any point during the past two decades, has not translated into an easily workable plan for such an undertaking. After all, the low prestige of military service in Russia is not limited to conscription alone. The architects of the 2008 reforms were painfully reminded of this fact when plans for the creation of a corps of professional sergeants faltered because of the inability to sign up 'quality' volunteers in sufficient numbers. 59 The poor image of military service in addition to Russia's demographic problems means that the country will continue to struggle recruiting the number conscripts it needs, let alone the amount of soldiers required for a fully professional force. 60 to missions on the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Given the extent of involvement in interventions and stabilization operations over the past two decades, however, doubts have been raised in some quarters about the sustainability of this idea. 70 Perceived challenges include abovementioned fears that all-purpose forces would lose the prowess for 'fighting heavy'. Others questioned whether 'traditional' military culture would prevent soldiers from ever seeing post-Cold war missions as more than a diversion from their core professional activity; 71 or if the service cultures of military and civilian actors having to cooperate in stabilization operations were too incompatible to ever allow a truly comprehensive approach. 72 As Gentile concluded in his article above, the quest to 'build an army to win all wars' would not be easy. One way of overcoming the problems associated with the use of conventional troops in military operations other than war would be the creation of separate units dedicated to specific missions, as suggested, for example, by Kevin Stringer in his alternative vision for the US military. As he himself acknowledged, however, such a drastic approach to transformation would be likely to be met with resistance as it runs counter 'to the wider [US] Army culture'. 73 Stringer's alternative remains on the margins of Western debate, yet the core of his idea, by contrast, is far from radical within the context of contemporary Russia.
Although the issue has been rarely ever raised in discussions of military reform and capabilities, the country already has a number of armed units dedicated to specific missions at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. European spending on defence. But it is unrealistic given the multitude of problems the Russian military continues to face and that will require both long-term strategic attention and focused resources. Now is the time to abandon hyperbolic portrayals of Russian military might or decay.
